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COMPANIES IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: ARE THE CONFLICT-OF-
LAW RULES READY FOR 1992?
Andreas Reindl*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a modem economy, companies are an important form for pur-
suing business activities. When states purport to create an integrated
market system, the ability of companies to do business within this
market with a minimum of restrictions becomes essential in order to
achieve a better allocation of resources. For this purpose, a company
must be able to acquire property, access the courts, organize branches
or subsidiaries and generally do business at any place it deems most
favorable. In order to operate, the company must be recognized as a
legal entity in the courts regardless of whether it has conformed with
the host country's law of business organization or the home country's
provisions on location of its activities.' Thus, in an efficient, integrated
system of states, the traditional concept that a state, on the basis of its
internal law or international comity,2 may or may not recognize a for-
eign company whose existence and legal character is derived from a
* Magister Juris, Vienna University Law School, 1987; LL.M., University of Michigan,
1989. Institute of Civil Law, Vienna University Law School, 1985-88; currently with the Insti-
tute of Commercial Law, Vienna University Law School.
I am most grateful to Professor Eric Stein for encouraging me to write this article, and for
criticizing earlier drafts.
1. In the European discussion on the compatibility of conflict-of-law rules with the EEC
Treaty, "recognition" in the first place refers to the question whether the legal existence - i.e.,
the capacity to hold rights and bear duties - of a company which has been created by a foreign
law is accepted at all. If a foreign company is viewed as legally non-existent, any further question
as to the position resulting from the recognition cannot arise. Thus, the extent and possible
effects of a recognition (whether, e.g., a foreign company has the same capacity as in its home
state, is subject to any restrictions in its business activities or must conform with local company
laws concerning internal affairs) are not primarily discussed. For the European position see gen-
erally, Beitzge, Anerkennung und Sitzverlegung von Juristischen Personen im EWG-Bereich, 127
ZErrscHRiFTr FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 1, 3
(1965); and Diephuis, The Concept of Recognition, 27 NETrI. INT'L L. REV. 347 (1980). Besides
legal personality and capacity, recognition includes the limited liability of its members, segrega-
tion of the private property of members from that of the entity, and the constitution of the
company, including the distribution of powers amongst its organs. Id. at 349.
2. During a highly protectionist period in Europe in the 19th century which featured strict
control over all business activities, legal personality was conferred upon an association by a grant
of the sovereign. Later, states developed a more liberal attitude. Today, in general they automati-
cally recognize the legal personality conferred upon a company by a foreign state. See H. WIEDE-
MANN, I GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT 777 (1980); Diephuis, supra note 1, at 349.
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foreign state will gradually be replaced by a duty imposed on the states
by the "federal" order.
This article describes the current situation in the emerging inte-
grated system of the European Community, focusing on the potential
conflict between Community rules on the freedom of establishment
and national conflict-of-law rules relating to companies. In the first
part, I shall outline the relevant provisions of EC law and the two
conflict-of-law concepts presently exhibited in the national laws of the
Member States. In the second part, I shall discuss three cases in which
the European Court of Justice recently addressed this subject. In the
third part, I shall analyze the impact of the Court's opinions, and fi-
nally outline options for future legislative and other action.
COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL CONFLICT-OF-LAW RULES
The founders of the European Community saw in unrestricted
transborder activities of companies an important tool for the creation
of a common market. The freedom of establishment, 3 granted to both
natural persons and companies, is one of the "basic" freedoms pro-
vided by the Treaty.4 It is laid down in article 52's guarantee of this
right to all Community companies; 5 paragraph 1 mentions both "pri-
mary" and "secondary" establishment. 6 Article 58 specifies that all
3. No clear definition of the term "establishment" exists, in particular regarding the distinc-
tion to the providing of services. It consists of the conduct of an economic activity from a fixed
base, if not on a permanent basis, at least from a durable one; it usually involves the occupation
of premises there.
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The other basic freedoms are the free movement of goods (arts. 9-37),
workers (arts. 48-51), services (arts. 59-66) and capital (arts. 67-73).
5. Article 52 states:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall
be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transitional period. Such progressive
abolition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiar-
ies by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right... to set up and manage undertakings,
in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58,
under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such
an establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
The transitional period, mentioned in the first paragraph, ended in 1970. This provision
is directly applicable. See Reyners v. Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 631.
6, "Primary establishment" means the setting up of the principal place of business in a terri-
tory; it includes the case of a transfer of the company headquarters. "Secondary establishment"
means setting up a subsidiary, agency or branch. While in the first case the principal place of
business does not remain in the originating state, in the second case the center of the enterprise is
not removed; only an additional, subordinate place of business is created.
The right of secondary establishment requires an already existing link to the economy of a
Member State. See Behrens, Niederlassungsfreiheit und Internationales Geselischaftsrecht, 52
RABELS ZEIrSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
[RAaELsZ] 498, 499 (1988); Timmermans, The Convention of 29 February 1968 on the Mutual
Recognition of Companies and Firms, 27 NETHt. INT'L L. Ruv. 357, 359 (1980). The additional
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companies formed in accordance with the law of a Member State
which have their registered office, central administration or principal
place of business in a Member State enjoy this right.7 The recognition
of a company in the state where the company decides to do business is
necessary for the exercise of the right of establishment." Thus, one
should expect that a Member State can no longer decide on the basis
of nationality9 which "foreign" company of another Member State to
recognize and grant free establishment.
Finally, one has to mention article 220, which addresses the situa-
tion where a company transfers its management to another Member
State. Article 220 stipulates that the Member States shall enter into
negotiations on the "retention of legal personality [of companies] in
the event of a transfer of their seat from one country to another."' 1
requirement of an economic link is inferred from the different wording of the first and second
sentence of article 52(1). The first sentence gives a general right to freedom of establishment to
any national of a Member State which can be exercised by founding a principal place of business
in a Member State ("primary establishment"). The second sentence provides the right to set up a
branch, agency or subsidiary only under the additional requirement that the company is already
established in a Member State ("secondary establishment"). This difference also is expressed in
Part I of the General Programme on Establishment, 5 J.O. Comm. EUR. (No. C2) 36 (1962).
7. Article 58 states:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Com-
munity shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons
who are nationals of Member States.
"Companies or firms" means companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial
law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private
law, save for those which are non-profit-making.
8. See H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 2, at 793, who affirms that the permission to conduct
business activities in the form of an establishment always includes the recognition of the foreign
entity. By granting the right of establishment, recognition as a legal personality is decided at the
same time. See also Steindorf, Gemeinsamer Markt als Binnenmarkt, 150 ZHR 687, 694 (1986),
who speaks of the affirmative effect of the freedoms under Community law. The exercise of these
rights must in fact be possible; thus, the legal existence must be assured in every Community
State.
9. For a discussion of the "nationality" of a company, see F. BURROWS, FREE MOVEMENT
IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 182-83 (1987). Burrows suggests that article 58 specifies the
sole test for nationality, requiring only that a company is formed in accordance with the law of a
Member State or alternatively has either its registered office, seat of management or principal
place of business within the Community. Once the requirements of article 58 are met, the com-
pany would become a "Community national" and enjoy the right of establishment.
Two of these elements - the territory where a company is incorporated and the place of its
registered office, specified in the company's charter - will normally coincide since the place of
the registered office will determine the jurisdiction of the registering authority. Behrens, supra
note 6, at 499; Kozyris, Corporate Wars and oice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 50.
10. Article 220 states:
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a
view to securing for the benefit of their nationals... the mutual recognition of companies or
firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58, the retention of legal per-
sonality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another.
It is recognized by many authors that article 220 requires Member States to enter into negoti-
ations, if necessary, rather than simply granting them an option to negotiate. The latter interpre-
tation would render article 220 redundant, for it is in the original competence of each Member
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A company incorporated in a Member State that decides to trans-
fer its seat" to another Member State without changing its incorpora-
tion still faces a problem in the EC. Most of the Member States do not
automatically recognize the legal personality of a transferring com-
pany; rather, they require the formation of a new company in compli-
ance with the company laws of the receiving state and its
incorporation there. This results from national conflict-of-law rules re-
garding the recognition of foreign companies and the law governing its
internal relationships.' 2 These rules are based on the "headquarters
theory," which states that the law of the place of the management -
the real seat of a company - provides the law governing all aspects of
the company, including its legal personality and internal regime.' 3
State to enter into negotiations and to conclude agreements with other Member States. Hence,
article 220 can only have the purpose of constituting a duty of the Member States. See Schwarz,
Verhandlungen der Mitgliedstaaten, in 2 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG VERTRAG 972-74 (H. von der
Groeben, H. von Boeckh, J. Thiesing & C.-D. Ehlermann 3d ed. 1983).
11. The terms "management," "seat" and "headquarters" are used indiscriminately to de-
scribe the company's real seat (sifge r(el), the place where the "brain" or "nerve center" are
located, where decisions are made and control over the company is exercised. The statutory seat
of registration, specified in the company's charter, will be called the "registered office."
12. It is the prevailing view in the European discussion that the distinction between the law
determining the company's legal capacity and the law regulating other aspects has become un-
necessary. "Recognition" of a foreign company's legal existence was used in the early days of
transnational corporate activities as a tool to protect a state against foreign "tramp companies."
Today, with the international standard of an automatic recognition, the conflict-of-law rule
would point only to one law which then is applied to all aspects of a company; it would also
decide the legal existence. See Ebenroth & Sura, Das Problem der Anerkennung im
internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht, 43 RABELSZ 315, 317 (1979); Drobnig, Kritische
Bemerkungen zum Vorentwurf eines EWGJ-Ubereinkommens uiber die Anerkennung von Gesell-
schaften, 129 ZHR 93 (1966).
But see Grossfeld, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht, in KOMMENTAR zUM BORGERLICHES
GESETBUCH (Staudinger ed. 1981), who insists that "recognition" - meaning the recognition
as a legal entity - still has its own value as a separate issue. He points to the fact that in various
fields recognition remains a separate issue, and some national laws would still acknowledge a
separate act of recognition. He mentions also the specific character - in particular social aspects
- of a company that would justify a different treatment of natural and legal persons, and a
separate use of this concept regarding companies.
One could further add that the term is repeatedly used in international agreements and the
EEC Treaty. It seems therefore justified to discuss separately the recognition aspect although it
has no particular legal significance.
13. Since the local law also determines the legal existence, the company must be incorporated
where the company's real seat is located. This is significantly different from the U.S. concept
where the legal existence of a corporation created by another state is never questioned; the dis-
cussion only focuses on the problem of the extent to which local law may be imposed on the
internal affairs of a company. See Buxbaum, The Origins of the American "Internal Affairs" Rule
in the Corporate Conflict of Laws in FESTSCHRIFr FOR GERHARD KEGEL ZUM 75. GEBURT-
STAG 75, 86 (H.-J. Musiak & K. Schurig eds. 1987), who provides a historical explanation: in the
19th century, U.S. companies incorporated in Northwestern states were active in Southern states
less for the purpose of mobilizing local capital than for conducting local business on the basis of
their home capital; host states did not have to exercise control over investment (and thus over the
internal affairs), but over business activities. On the other hand, European states already suffered
from pseudo-foreign corporate distortion and local capital claiming foreign status; for an effective
control of this phenomenon, they developed the headquarters theory.
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Under this conflict-of-law rule, a company must always be incorpo-
rated in the country where it has its real seat; it must be "created" by
local law.14 If the company attempts to transfer its seat to another
state without incorporation in its new host state, it loses its legal
personality. 1
5
Under the so-called "incorporation theory," on the other hand, the
law of the state where a corporation is incorporated and has its regis-
tered office should always govern legal personality and other related
questions. Even if the corporation moves its management and activi-
ties into another territory, the law of the state of incorporation should
still govern the company. A transfer of the management to another
state would not change the law governing the company and affect the
company's legal personality.
16
Therefore, there is potential conflict between article 220 and arti-
14. The incorporation in the new host state is only possible if the company's structure con-
forms with the host state's company laws. This is the very purpose of the headquarters theory, a
reaction to transborder mobility of companies: the state seeks to enforce local laws - in particu-
lar concerning employee co-determination and creditor protection - against any organization
with its real seat in the state's territory that claims to derive its existence, legal character and
governing law from a foreign state. Non-compliance with local law is sanctioned with non-exist-
ence for the lack of incorporation. See E. RABEL, 2 THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 39 (2d ed. 1960);
Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 85; for further comment, see infra note 15.
15. E. RABEL, supra note 14, at 38; Behrens, Identitdtswahrende Sitzverlegung einer
Kapitalgesellschaft von Luxemburg in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 32 RECHT DER IN-
TERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr [RIW] 590, 591 (1986), speaks of an act of suicide if a company
transfers only the management without a concurrent incorporation in the receiving state.
A company may attempt to transfer only its management for several reasons. In doing so, it
would be able to transfer the operational center to newly emerging markets without the delay of a
liquidation in the first and subsequent incorporation in the second state; Sandrock, Sitztheorie,
Uberlagerungstheorie und der EWG-Vertrag: Wasser, Ound Feuer, 35 RIW 505, 512 (1989). It
might want to act in a more attractive market without being subject to local company laws
requiring high capital resources or employee co-determination. Besides, the company may have
fiscal reasons: if it transfers its seat it might no longer be liable for taxes in the originating state
and could reduce tax payments; Ebenroth & Eyles, Die innereuropdische Verlegung des Gesell-
schaftssitzes als Ausfluss der Niederlassungsfreiheit, 42 DER BETRIEB 363, 364 (1989).
There exists no precise definition of the legal consequences of such a denial. Grossfeld, supra
note 12, at 331, assumes that the headquarters theory has such a strong preventive effect that
only in rare cases do legal disputes arise before the courts.
Some of the effects can be summarized as follows. First, the law of the place of the central
management would determine that no registration exists in the relevant legal system, and the
company would become a "non-existent legal person." As such, it could not acquire property
rights. In this context, German courts held that a company, incorporated under foreign law,
cannot become the general partner in a limited partnership after the shareholders decided to
transfer the company's seat to Germany. Judgment of June 7, 1984, OLG, Niirnberg, 5 PRAxis
DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRax] 342 (1985).
Those who act in the name of the company become liable but acquire no rights under con-
tracts purportedly concluded in the name of the company. See Grossfeld, supra note 12, at 344.
The company also has no active standing. According to Grossfeld, ia at 346, and OLG, Niirn-
berg, supra, at 342, however, the foreign entity has passive standing together with the persons
who acted in its name.
I Finally, the domestic mandatory rules on employee co-determination would apply to the
company.
16. Among the EC Member States, the Netherlands and probably Denmark are the only
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cles 52 and 58 concerning the right of establishment. The resolution of
this conflict also affects the compatibility of the national conflict-of-
law rules with the Treaty. Does the right of establishment under arti-
cles 52 and 58 include the right of a company, once incorporated in a
Member State, to have its personality recognized after transferring its
management to another state? Or does article 220 indicate that the
right of establishment provisions in articles 52 and 58 are narrower
and do not cover the transfer situation? To phrase it differently: Can
Member States still lawfully adhere to the headquarters theory and
require a company that transfers its management to incorporate as a
new company in the receiving state? Or do articles 52 and 58 impose
the incorporation theory as a Community-wide, uniform conflict-of-
law rule upon the Member States, so that the receiving Member States
are duty-bound to recognize the "immigrating" foreign company's
legal existence and grant it the same rights as enjoyed by domestic
companies, even if the structure of the "migrant" company does not fit
into the scheme of domestic company law?
II. THE TRIAD OF CASES
The debate about the relationship between article 220 and articles
52 and 58 started soon after the formation of the EEC. For a long time
the problem was only the subject of an academic discussion that failed
to lead to a generally accepted solution. Only recently did the Euro-
pean Court of Justice decide three cases which dealt with the scope of
articles 52 and 58 and their relation to article 220. The first two cases
included important statements on articles 52 and 58, although the
Court referred only to the right of secondary establishment.1 7 In the
third case, the Daily Case, the Court had to address directly the im-
pact of article 220 on article 58.
A. Commission v. France18
This case involved provisions of French tax law designed to avoid
the double taxation of corporate dividends, first as income of the com-
pany, then as income of the shareholders. It granted the shareholders
a tax credit of 50% of the taxes paid by the company on the amount
civil-law countries that - together with the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland -
follow the incorporation theory. See Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 366.
For an overview on the development of the two theories, see Grossfeld, Die Entwicklung der
Anerkennungstheorien im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR HARRY WEs-
TERMANN 199, 200 (W. Hefermehl, R. Gm6r & H. Brox eds. 1974).
17. See supra note 6.
18.. 1986 E.C.R. 273.
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distributed. 19 This concession, however, was available only to share-
holders with a habitual residence or registered office in France. Com-
panies incorporated in France, including French subsidiaries of
foreign companies, could therefore profit from this advantage if they
owned shares of other companies. But agencies or branches of compa-
nies incorporated outside France could not claim the credit, although
they were liable to taxation on profits in France.
The Commission brought an action under article 16920 against
France asserting that this situation would violate article 52 for two
reasons. First, the distinction between the agency or branch of a do-
mestic company on the one hand, and of a foreign company on the
other, discriminated against the foreign company. Second, since for-
eign companies were likely to be induced to establish a subsidiary in-
stead of a branch or agency in order to benefit from the French tax
provisions, the free choice between the forms of establishment was dis-
proportionately restricted.2
1
As to article 52, the Court held that a discrimination against agen-
cies or branches of Member State companies or any indirect restriction
on the freedom of establishment was prohibited.22 The Court referred
to article 58, under which a company, formed under the law of a
Member State, and having its registered office, central administration
or principal place of business in a Member State, would have a right to
pursue activities in another Member State through a branch or agency.
To deny a company equal treatment "solely by reason of the fact that
its registered office was in another Member State would deprive that
provision of all meaning. ' '23 The Court also rejected the French argu-
ment that foreign companies were still free to set up subsidiaries that
would enjoy the tax concession. Article 52 expressly preserves a com-
pany's free choice of the legal form in which to do business in another
state and that freedom of choice must not be limited by discriminatory
tax provisions. 24.
19. General Tax Code, arts. 205-06, fixing a 50% income tax on company income, and art.
158, providing for the tax credit (avoir fiscal).
20. Article 169 regulates the supervision by the Commission over the acts of Member States.
In the ultimate stage, the Commission may bring an action before the Court if it is of the opinion
that a Member State is infringing Community law.
21. In its application, the Commission referred only to insurance companies because com-
plaints were brought only from this business branch. Both the Commission and the Court stated,
however, that the case would equally apply to any other industry. 1986 E.C.R. 273, 301.
22. Id at 303 permits this conclusion; the Court stated that the two allegations of the Com-
mission were related and therefore should be considered together.
23. Id at 304. The Court stated that with regard to companies it is the "registered office...
that serves as the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular state, like nationality in
the case of natural persons." Id
24. Id at 305.
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B. Segers v. K. Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank en Verzekeringwezen,
Groothandel en Vrije Beropen 2
5
This case emerged from a litigation between Mr. Segers, a Dutch
national, and the Dutch authorities which administered the national
health insurance scheme. Initially, Mr. Segers was the sole proprietor
of a Dutch enterprise that provided investment services in the Nether-
lands. He then founded a British company and transformed his enter-
prise in the Netherlands into a subsidiary of the British limited
company. Mr. Segers became the major shareholder and director of
the British company. He maintained his residence in the Netherlands
and conducted all business activities through the Dutch subsidiary.
The Dutch social security plan providing for health benefits permitted
company directors to participate in the insurance plan even if they
held more than 50% of the shares of the company. In the case of Mr.
Segers, however, the Dutch insurance authority denied him the bene-
fits on the ground that he was director of a company registered
outside, but pursuing virtually all its activities inside, the Netherlands;
the denial was necessary in order to prevent fraud against national
rules.26 On Mr. Segers' appeal, the Dutch court requested the Euro-
pean Court to determine whether the distinction in the social security
law between directors or major shareholders of companies incorpo-
rated in the Netherlands and those incorporated in another Member
State violated articles 52 and 58.27
In the course of the proceeding before the European Court, the
Dutch authorities repeated that the conversion of an undertaking into
a subsidiary of a company incorporated in another Member State
could have a fraudulent purpose. The Advocate General responded
that taking advantage of the benefits of a national system was a logical
consequence of the right of free movement, and specifically of the free-
dom of establishment. It was the objective of that freedom that a na-
tional of a Member State should be able to use the advantages
provided by the law of another Member State. This included the right
to take advantage of the flexibility of British company law which per-
mitted the Segers arrangement and made it possible to exploit its
attractions.
28
The Court followed the Advocate General's opinion. It stated that,
25. 1986 E.C.R. 2375.
26. See point 6 of the opinion of the Advocate General, It at 2380.
27. Under article 177, a national court is entitled, and in the highest instance even obliged, to
ask the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Treaty if it
considers that the decision on such a question is necessary to enable it to give judgment.
28. 1986 E.C.R. at 2380.
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under article 58, a company formed in accordance with the law of a
Member State must be free to conduct its business in another Member
State in whatever form it elects. Therefore, the location of the com-
pany's registered office could not be the basis for differentiation, and
the fact that Mr. Segers, who lived in the Netherlands, was director of
a British company could not justify the denial of benefits. 29
C. Regina v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue
ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust pkc 30
The Daily Mail and General Trust plc, a company incorporated in
the United Kingdom, decided to transfer its headquarters to the
Netherlands while maintaining its British incorporation. Under Brit-
ish company law, consistent with the incorporation theory, a company
may do so without losing its legal personality. However, according to
British tax law, a company needs the approval of the transfer by the
tax authorities; without such an approval, the company would lose its
legal personality and be subject to winding-up-like procedures. 31
Daily Mail made the appropriate applications, but, without waiting for
the decision, proceeded with the transfer and commenced rendering
services to clients in the Netherlands. The British tax authorities de-
nied their approval unless at least parts of the company's assets were
sold before the company moved its management to the Netherlands
and ceased to be taxable in the United Kingdom. When protracted
negotiations with the British tax authorities brought no solution, Daily
Mail initiated proceedings before the High Court, Queen's Bench Di-
vision. It claimed that the application of the tax provisions was con-
trary to EC law, since the right of free establishment of companies
under article 58 included an unconditional right to move its headquar-
ters without any prior authorization of the tax authorities. The British
court stayed the action and referred to the European Court of Justice
the question whether the British tax statute prohibiting a corporation
with its headquarters in the United Kingdom from moving its man-
agement to another Member State without prior approval of the tax
authorities would violate articles 52 and 58 of the EEC Treaty.32
29. Id at 2387-88.
30. [1988] Recueil 5483; 53 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 713 (1988).
31. Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1970 § 482(1Xa).
32. Again, the reference was based on article 177; see supra note 27. The question was re-
stricted to the fact that such an approval was required when tax upon profits should be avoided
or other already chargeable taxes circumvented. The Court, however, contrary to the Advocate
General, did not limit itself to the tax issue. Cf. the suggested ruling by the Advocate General, 53
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 721, and the Court's statements in paras. 23-24, id. at 726. See infra note
50 and accompanying text.
1278 [Vol. 11:1270
Summer 1990] Companies in the European Community
Before the Court, Daily Mail was opposed by both the Advocate
General and the Commission. The Advocate General seemed to ac-
knowledge that such a transfer would fall under the term "establish-
ment."133 He stated, however, that the Treaty allowed a Member State
to restrict the right to transfer the central administration of a company
in order to prevent an abuse of rights granted under the Treaty. He
would deny Daily Mail's application on the ground that the require-
ment to settle its fiscal position prior to a transfer did not violate Com-
munity law as it presently stands. Therefore, Member States could
lawfully attach fiscal consequences to such a transfer similar to a liqui-
dation of a company.
34
The Court agreed with the Advocate General in upholding the
British statute, but adopted a broader language than was necessary for
deciding the case. It stated that a company could exercise its right of
establishment in another Member State either by setting up an agency,
a branch or a subsidiary or by winding up and incorporating as a new
company there.3 . However, in the current state of Community law,
companies were creatures of national law and the legislation in the
Member States differed widely both as regards the connecting factors36
for the applicable company law, and the question whether a company
incorporated in one Member State could change the connecting fac-
tor.37 At present, neither Community directives on harmonization of
company laws38 nor the conventions envisaged by article 220 have
dealt with this issue. Thus, the right to retain the status of a company
after a transfer of its headquarters from one Member State to another
is not guaranteed by Community law. It is not possible to claim a right
33. 53 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 719-20.
34. Id.
35. Id at 725. For criticism of the Court's statement that winding up and re-incorporation in
a new Member State would also satisfy the freedom of movement right, see Sandrock &
Austmann, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach der Daily Mail-Entscheidung des Europ'is-
chen Gerichtshofs" Quo vadis?, 35 RIW 249, 250 (1989).
36. The "connecting factor" is the element which determines the substantive law that is ap-
plicable in a conflict-of-law case. For companies, it may either be the place of incorporation or
the seat of the company; see supra, text following note 12.
37. The Court cites article 58 placing the incorporation the seat and the place of principal
business on equal footing. 53 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 726. This would indicate that Member States
can choose between these three for the connecting factor. It seems, however, that article 58
provides exactly the opposite; it grants companies a right to choose. This right is effective against
the Member States, so they must recognize every alternative.
38. These directives are based on article 54, which provides that the Council shall issue direc-
tives to implement the freedom of establishment. With regard to companies, para. (3)(g) specifies
that the Council shall co-ordinate
to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members
and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms within the meaning of the
second paragraph of Article 58 with a view to making such safeguards equivalent through-
out the Community.
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under articles 52 and 58 to transfer the central management and con-
trol to another Member State; national law is not preempted by the
provisions of the EEC Treaty.
39
III. POSSIBLE RECONCILIATIONS
The three decisions concurred in the proposition that article 58
contains directly applicable law. 40 Therefore, the contention that arti-
cles 52 and 58 include only a general program and are not directly
applicable to companies can no longer be maintained.
41
It is difficult, however, to reconcile the three decisions and deter-
mine the exact scope of the right protected by articles 52 and 58. On
the one hand, Commission v. France lays down a sweeping prohibition
of any restriction on the freedom of establishment for companies.
More specifically, in Daily the Court declares that an attempt to re-
strict a company from moving its seat to another Member State would
violate articles 52 and 58.42 Segers provides another argument that the
39. 53 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 726.
40. For natural persons, the Court has held article 52 directly applicable in Reyners v.
Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 631.
"Directly applicable" means that individuals can invoke their right under Community law
before national courts even if national laws contradict the Community law. Van Gend & Loos,
1963 E.C.R. 1.
See Timmermans, supra note 6, at 357-58, who argues for the direct applicability for compa-
nies and concludes that the law of the receiving state may apply only to the extent that it would
not hinder the actual exercise of the right of establishment.
41. Initially, the direct applicability of articles 52 and 58 to a company's right of establish-
ment was denied. Although the principle of establishment was included in the Treaty, it was too
diffuse and general with regard to companies and did not confer directly invocable rights. Thus,
national conflict-of-law rules were not preempted under Community Law. See Grossfeld, supra
note 12, at 92, arguing that articles 52 and 58 contain at present only general programmatic
ideas. See also Grossfeld, Die Simheorie des Internationalen Privatrechts in der Europaschen
Gemeinschaft, 6 IPRAx 145, 146 (1986), speaking of an "interpreting away" of the wording of
article 220 when he defends the compatibility of the headquarters theory with the Treaty.
However, considering the legal history of article 220, one may counter-argue that this article
was never meant to justify the headquarters theory. Article 220 was finalized only at the very end
of the negotiations on the EEC Treaty in 1957. One can argue that it is only a subsidiary provi-
sion which neither replaces, nor limits or specifies other Treaty provisions but has only a comple-
mentary function. The clause "as far as necessary" was only included because the Contracting
Parties did not know with certainty in which areas additional measures were still necessary.
Although article 220 speaks of an agreement between Member States on mutual recognition, it
does not exclude the possibility that mutual recognition is already required by other provisions of
the Treaty. For the legal history of article 220, see Schwarz, supra note 10, at 976-77.
42. 53 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 724 states "... prohibit the member-State of origin from hinder-
ing the establishment in another member-State of one of its nationals or of a company incorpo-
rated under its legislation..." Arguably, this language would include both discrimination and
disproportionate restriction.
Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 372, think the Court could have easily avoided this
statement on articles 52 and 58 by referring to an earlier decision in Robert Fearon & Co. v. Irish
Land Comm'n, 1984 E.C.R. 3677. There the Court had held that an Irish company could not
invoke the right of free establishment under article 58 in order to challenge provisions of Irish
law because nationals were not protected against restrictions imposed by the law of their home
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freedom of establishment should prevail over state interests. Under ar-
ticles 52 and 58, the Court granted Mr. Segers the right to choose the
legal regime governing his enterprise although its location does not
change. This choice is exactly what the headquarters theory tries to
prevent.43 The Court also held that the freedom of establishment of a
company cannot be restricted solely on the ground that its office is
registered in another Member State.44 The fact that the company did
not pursue any activities in the state in which it was incorporated
could not justify a restriction on the freedom of establishment. 45 These
statements suggested that the headquarters theory could not survive,
once challenged directly before the Court.46
On the other hand, the Court upheld the British tax law that - in
keeping with the headquarters theory - imposed the loss of legal
existence on a domestic company transferring its managment to an-
other state.
A. A Narrow Reading of the Third Case - Confining Daily Mail
to its Fiscal Aspects
The most obvious way to reconcile the three decisions is to restrict
the reading of the Daily Mail decision to the holding on the facts of the
case. Under this interpretation, the Court's holding is confined to the
proposition that the home state is free to protect its tax interests by
state. Id at 3685. In Daily Mail, the Court discussed the freedom of establishment in the context
of a British law that restricted a company which was registered in the United Kingdom.
The cases seem, however, to be distinguishable because in Fearon the Irish company itself did
not seek a transfer into another Member State; thus, article 58 could not govern the case. In
Daily Mail, on the other hand, the intention of the British company to move to another state
created the connection to another Member State and was sufficient to invoke a right under article
58.
43. See supra notes 13.15 and accompanying text. By Mr. Segers' transaction the enterprise,
initially owned by Mr. Segers and governed by Dutch law, became the property of a company
incorporated under British law without changing its place of business. The Court mentions only
the right of secondary establishment; in economic terms, however, the situation is similar to a
transborder merger. See Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 371. They criticize this decision and
argue that transborder mergers are not regulated by Community law and national provisions
restricting such activities should not be limited by articles 52 and 58.
44. 1986 E.C.R. at 2387, citing Commission v. France; see also Cath, Freedom of Ftablish-
ment of Companie" A New Step Towards Completion of the Internal Market, 6 Y.B. EUR. L. 247,
259 (1987).
45. 1986 E.C.R. at 2388; see Cath, supra note 44, at 259, stating that "the Court refused to
look behind the veil of the company."
46. Cath, supra note 44, at 261, states that "it may be inferred that a two-century old discus-
sion with regard to the doctrines of siege Mel' and 'incorporation' has been (implicitly) decided
in favor of the latter in so far as intra-Community cross-border establishment of companies is
concerned."
See al Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 371. They particularly refer to the Segers case
and concede that this decision provided the strongest argument against the compatibility of the
headquarters theory with Community law.
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imposing winding-up procedures if the migrating company has not
cleared its financial position. The effective enforcement of tax provi-
sions legitimizes restrictions on the freedom of movement.4 7 In previ-
ous cases the Court has repeatedly confirmed the broad power of
Member States in the fiscal field, including the authorization to impose
criminal sanctions aimed at preventing tax fraud.
48
Commission v. France, then, could be distinguished: while the Brit-
ish tax law in Daily Mail was permissible as the only way to secure the
effective enforcement of national tax rules, the French law discrimi-
nated against foreign companies and thus violated Community law. If
one takes this view, the question whether a receiving state could law-
fully apply the headquarters theory in other circumstances and require
a formation and incorporation of a new company was not reached by
the Court and the debate between "headquarterists" and "incorpora-
tionists" would remain undecided.49
B. A Narrow Reading of "Establishment" - The Language
of the Court
The second way to explain, if not reconcile, the cases points to the
Court's narrow definition of the term "establishment." When the
Court spoke of the right of establishment in the Daily Mail case, it had
in mind only the second sentence of article 52(l),50 which discusses
47. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 662.
48. Such national measures were held permissible even if no fraudulent intent was proven.
See Carciati, 1980 E.C.R. 2773, and Abbink, 1984 E.C.R. 4097. In these cases the Court upheld
prohibitions for persons residing in the importation state to use cars which were registered in
another Member State, imported for temporary use and therefore exempt from the payment of
value added tax (VAT). The provisions, including criminal sanctions, potentially restrict free
movement but were held permissible because they prevent the circumvention of national tax laws
on VAT.
In Italy v. Rainer Drexl, 55 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 241 (1989), the Court pointed out that crimi-
nal sanctions must be proportionate to the gravity of the offense. Although Member States are
still responsible for fiscal regulations, Community law sets the limit that national laws may not
have the effect of jeopardizing the freedom of movement. Confiscation of a car for which the
value added tax had not been paid upon importation is disproportionate.
49. Sandrock, supra note 15, at 512 n.59, emphasizes that by its facts the case was limited to
tax provisions, that and a greater autonomy in fiscal matters has always been recognized by the
Court. He also points out that the decision involved two states that apply the incorporation
theory, and thus the headquarters theory was not an issue before the Court. He doubts whether
all the arguments that could be made against the headquarters theory were brought up.
50. Daily Mail, 53 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 725. The statements of the Court seem to be contra-
dictory. First, it affirms the right of unrestricted secondary establishment and states that this "is
the form of establishment in which the applicant engaged in this case." Id. It continues that the
British law would not restrict this right, but finally finds that there are restrictions imposed by
the tax law which are, however, permissible. Id.
Apparently the Court's statement that the Daily Mail wanted to exercise the right of secon-
dary establishment is incorrect. Rather, the company attempted to remove its principal place of
business, and thus to exercise the right of primary establishment See supra note 6.
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the right of secondary establishment, or the right to choose between
setting up a subsidiary or acting through an agency or branch.5' It is
only this right that national laws must not limit.
The recognition of a company's legal existence in the event of a
transfer of its headquarters, however, raises a problem of the right of
primary establishment.5 2 Due to article 220, this area remains subject
to limitations based on national conflict-of-law rules. National laws
which require an incorporation of a new company in the event of a
transfer of the management into another Member State and, by the
same token, limit the right of establishment would prevail, by virtue of
article 220.
According to this interpretation, the Court grants the Member
States wide discretion to deny the legal existence of a moving com-
pany.5 3 This would correspond to the view that the headquarters the-
ory is still compatible with the Treaty.54 For several reasons, it is
proposed that this interpretation indeed expresses the Court's opinion.
First, there is significant difference between the Advocate General's
opinion and the language of the Court in the Daily Mail case.55 The
proposed ruling of the Advocate General was limited to the fiscal as-
pects. The Court easily could have adopted this proposal; the result
would have been the same. But the language actually adopted by the
Court was significantly broader and also covered the right of the re-
ceiving state to decide upon the legal existence of an immigrating
company.
56
Second, apart from this contextual argument, one can also refer to
the arguments of supporters of the headquarters theory. It was pointed
out that the prohibition of indirect restrictions on free movement of
goods has never been extended explicitly to the establishment of com-
panies.57 Only discrimination was prohibited, and the headquarters
51. The limit the Court imposes on national laws means only that foreign and domestic
companies must be treated equally. Different treatment of agencies and subsidiaries is permissible
as long as it affects indistinctly all companies.
52. See supra note 6, on article 52's distinction between primary and secondary
establishment.
53. Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 372, emphasize that the Daily Mail decision is rele-
vant beyond its fiscal aspects and applicable to a receiving state as well.
54. Although even advocates of this theory admit that it represents a protective and restric-
tive concept. See Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 365, who state that one can simply say that
the headquarters theory largely thwarts the company's right of primary establishment.
55. See supra note 32.
56. 53 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 726; see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
57. The Court has developed the principle that non-discriminatory but unreasonable restric-
tions were prohibited in the area of goods as well as of services, but never clearly extended it to
the right of establishment, not even for natural persons. See, e.g., Procureur du Roi v. Das-
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theory could be applied in a non-discriminatory way.58 But even if
articles 52 and 58 extended to the prohibition of disproportionate re-
strictions, restrictions based on the headquarters theory were permissi-
ble since they were: (1) based on compelling reasons; (2) necessary to
protect legitimate local interests; and (3) reasonably related to their
objective and equally applied to all companies.59
The rationale for this position derives from the differences between
national company laws of the Member States, differences which are
apparently more substantial and of a different quality than in other
areas. European company laws tend to be highly regulatory and ex-
press social and political factors.6° The most frequently cited examples
are the rules on employee co-determination in the company manage-
ment and structures of company boards.61 National company laws in-
sonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837; De PeiJper, 1976 E.C.R. 613. For further references, see F. BuRROWS,
supra note 9, at 39-43.
See also Ebke, ",Ausldndische Kapitalgesellschaft & Ch KG" und das europdsche Gemein-
xhaftsrecht, 151 rrs Hswr FOR UNTERNEHMENS-UND GESELscHAFrSRECHT [ZGR] 245,
257-58 (1988). Even Belmms, supra note 6, at 512, an advocate of the incorporation theory, is
cautiously extending that second element, the prohibition of a non-discriminatory restriction, to
a company's right of establishment. He states that the case law of the Court "at least shows a first
sign of going beyond a mere prohibition of discrimination." See also Ordre des Avocates au
Barreau de Paris v. Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2971, discussed infra, note 82.
58. See Ebke, supra note 57, at 253, arguing that it is applicable to companies with a domes-
tic seat and foreign incorporation as well as companies incorporated abroad with domestic head-
quarters. He concedes that a different result is possible when the company has a foreign seat.
Then the conflict-of-law rules would lead to the applicability of the foreign law. If under that
legal system the incorporation theory were applied, the company could retain its legal personal-
ity. A company with a domestic seat would always lose that status. He justifies that result by
arguing that the domestic conflict-of-law rules are non-discriminatory, and only the foreign law
caused that distinction.
It is debatable whether this standard of comparison is correct. Advocates of the incorporation
theory would compare two companies which both have a domestic seat; one is incorporated
abroad, the other in the same country. Only the latter would be recognized under the headquar-
ters theory and the non-domestically incorporated company would be discriminated against be-
cause of the place of incorporation; see Behrens, supra note 6, at 518-20.
59. See Ebke, supra note 57, at 259, 265, where he applies these principles as they were
formulated by the Court in Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3755, to the headquarters
theory.
60. Stein, Use& Misuses and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 N.W. UNiv. L. REv. 198, 208
(1977); Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 76. The idea to regulate the social impact of companies is
also reflected in the development of "enterprise law" in the European discussion. It focuses on
the social impact which a company - regardless of its legal structure - has on its constituents,
such as employees, creditors or shareholders. The law should reach all these effects; regulations
of traditional corporate law would be insufficient for this task.
61. See, ag., Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor
Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1338, 1345 (1984).
For example, German companies always have a two-tier board system with a managing and
an independent supervising board. Co-determination is based on the representation of employees
on the supervisory board. It would be almost impossible for a company with one uniform board
that transfers its management to Germany to provide an adequate place for employees' repre-
sentatives.
See also infra note 72, for the different attitudes in the area of "industrial democracy."
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corporate solutions reached through complex political debates
involving not only political parties but also other interests, particularly
those of industry representatives and labor unions.62
The headquarters theory, "protected" under article 220, severely
limits a company's right under article 58. As the Advocate General in
Daily Mail pointed out, the incorporation theory is more consistent
with the free movement of companies called for by the EEC Treaty.63
On the other hand, because of the differences between company laws
and the modest progress in the harmonization process, the headquar-
ters theory appears to be the only way to protect national interests.
Any other result would impose a duty on Member States to acquiesce
in the establishment of companies in their territories, formed under a
foreign law, even if they were unable to provide the same level of pro-
tection for the company's constituencies, in particular for worker rep-
resentation within the corporate structure." Arguably, it is not
politically feasible to deprive the Member States of their right of na-
tional protection of public interest.
IV. FUTURE OPTIONS
The current situation allowing Member States to continue to apply
restrictive conflict-of-law rules to moving companies is unsatisfactory
and raises the problem of uncertainty concerning the limits of national
discretion. 65 In the last part of this essay I propose ways of escaping
62. See, e.g., Ebke, supra note 57, at 203; Hopt, supra note 61, at 1348-50.
63. 53 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 720. See also H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 2, at 791, who de-
scribes the headquarter theory as a "protection-theory," and seems to assume that it is contrary
to the ideas of the EEC Treaty.
We find the obligation of the Member States to accept the control and supervision of another
Member State also in the current efforts to overcome differences in national technical standards.
The new Community approach, based on the Council Resolution of 7 May 1985, 28 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 136) 1 (1985) on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards relies
on the idea of mutual recognition. What is good enough for the consumers in one Member State
must also be sufficient for the rest of the Community, even if that means the introduction of a
lower standard on the domestic market. This approach is reflected in the incorporation theory
rather than the headquarters theory.
64. Had the Court interpreted article 58 as a mandatory conflict-of-law rule, only the incor-
poration theory would be permissible. That would lead to a "harmonized participation model
through the back door," a conflict-of-law rule would have broader consequences than any mea-
sure taken by a Community institution.
Grossfeld & Luttermann, Comment on Daily Mail, 44 JURlSTENzErrUNG [JZ] 386, 387
(1989), state that national interests, presently protected under state laws, would have been sacri-
ficed on the altar of the freedom of establishment. Similarly, Ebenroth & Eyles,'supra note 15, at
414, emphasize that no extensive interpretation of article 58 should anticipate present harmoni-
zation efforts.
65. This is due to the two above-mentioned reasons: first, if Daily Mail is reduced to a tax
case, it would not at all address the headquarters theory; secondly, even if the Member States
retained their power in this area, fundamental principles of Community law would still apply to
national rules. Robert Fearon & Co. v. Irish Land Comm'n, 1984 E.C.R. 3677, 3685. The effect
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the dilemma. First, I shall describe possible Community solutions in-
cluding both harmonization of national company laws and a genuine
Community company law. I shall then discuss options available to the
Member States on a national level.
A. Community Measures
There are two ways for the EC to improve the current situation
and remove obstacles on the free movement of companies. The first is
harmonizing national company laws by directives based on article
54.66 With lesser variation between national laws, protection by con-
flict-of-law rules would become unnecessary. The harmonization di-
rectives adopted within the past 20 years cover various aspects of
enterprise control, such as the formation of corporations, capital re-
quirements, mergers within a state and accounting rules.67 So far,
however, the Community has been unable to adopt measures with an
impact on the most sensitive areas - company structure, worker co-
determination and taxation - the same issues which are cited as a
justification for the continued application of the headquarters theory.
Two proposals by the Commission are currently affected by this dead-
lock, the 5th Directive on the structure of companies and the 10th
Directive on transborder mergers.
68
The second way is to avoid reliance on national company laws by
creating a body of "EEC company law" through regulations based pri-
marily on article 235.69 Here, the Commission's plan for a European
company is most important. 70 It is based on the concept of a company
of these fundamental principles on the headquarters theory is discussed infra note 80 and accom-
panying text.
66. For the text of article 54, see supra note 38.
67. For a more detailed description, see Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 414.
68. The Commission itself apparently doubts whether the two directives will be adopted in
the near future; see Statute for a European Company, BULL. EC, Supp. 3/88, at 6 (1988).
69. This article is the "necessary and proper clause" of the EC Treaty. It provides that
[i]f action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation
of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not
provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
In the most recent proposal for a statute of a European company, the Commission claims
authority to regulate the creation and operation of the European company except rules dealing
with employee co-determination by a Regulation based on article 100A. Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, E.C. COMM'N Docs., COM (89) 268 final at
62. Article IOOA provides for the adoption of measures for the approximation of national laws
necessary for the establishment of the internal market. The Council can adopt such measures by
a qualified majority. The parallel Directive dealing with employee co-determination is based on
article 54, ld., at 140.
70. The first proposal dates back to 1970, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 124) 1 (1970), and
was amended in 1975, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for European Companies,
BULL. EC, Supp. 4/75 (1975). Recently, the Commission has put forward a new proposal. See
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chartered under EEC law. It would be registered in a Member State
but would be a "Community national," not subject to national restric-
tions. Accordingly, it could transfer its seat to any place in the Com-
munity without losing its legal personality.
For two reasons, however, this plan will not completely solve the
current problems. First, the same reluctance exists on the part of the
Member States to give up their national standards of worker co-deter-
mination. The most recent proposal provides for three substantially
different formulas and gives the Member States the opportunity to
choose one of the options for "European companies" incorporated in
their territory.7 1 But the possibility that companies could be formed
under an option that provides less protection and subsequently "immi-
grate" into other Member States has thus far prevented a break-
through of this ambitious plan.
72
Besides, even if the European company comes into existence, it will
have a limited scope. Only legal entities may form such a company;
natural persons are excluded. Moreover, incorporation of a company
under a national regime will remain possible and thus the existence of
various types of companies will continue.73
BULL. EC, Supp. 3/88 (1988), for the memorandum of the Commission and E.C. CoMM'N
DOCs. COM (89) 268 FINAL FOR THE PROPOSED MEASURES.
ONE REGULATION ALREADY HAS BEEN ADOPTED. SINCE JULY 1, 1989, THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPING, EEIG, HAVE EXISTED UNDER COMMUNITY LAW. 28 O.J.
EUR. Comm. (No. L 199) 1 (1985). It permits a greater cooperation between small and medium-
sized companies. There are limits, such as the number of employees and the fact that the EEIG
itself is prohibited from making profits and has no access to capital markets. Hence there exist
doubts whether it will provide a successful way for a cooperation on a Community level. See
Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 414.
71. Article 3 of the Proposal for a Council Directive Complementing the Statute for a Euro-
pean Company, E.C. COMM'N Docs., COM(89) 268 final, at 142-43. The three options permit
participation on the supervisory board (art. 4; German system); through a body separate from
the company organs (art. 5); and through collectively agreed systems, agreed upon within the
company (art. 6). See also BULL. EC, Supp. 3/88, at 14 (1988).
72. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the area of "industrial democracy" determin-
ing the fate of the "Vredeling" Directive, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (1980), amended in
26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (1983), dealing with information and consulting procedures
for employees. The proposal was never adopted.
For the role of unions in the collective bargaining process, see Nelson, The Vredeling Direc.
tive: The EEC's Failed Attempt to Regulate Multinational Enterprises and Organize Collective
Bargaining, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 967, 979-82 (1988). See also Westermann, Tendenzen
der gegenwartigigen Mitbestimmungsdiskussion in der EG, 48 RABELSZ 123, 128 (1984). He de-
scribes various attitudes currently existing in the Member States. As to the role of labor unions,
there is first the British approach of collective bargaining which is "hardly understandable for a
spectator from the European continent." Id. at 129. The situation also differs widely as to the
degree of centralization of the union's decision making process. Italy and France represent a
more decentralized system with powerful representation on a plant level, while in the Benelux
countries national centralized labor councils have a strong political influence.
73. The third way, an international agreement pursuant to article 220, appears to be a dead
end. The Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies, negotiated among the original
six Member States, never came into force because the Netherlands refused its ratification. Negoti-
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B. National Measures
Two approaches utilizing national measures could be undertaken
- splitting applicable laws or changing the company's legal form
without a loss of legal identity. In the first approach, Member States
would accept a "derivative" of the incorporation theory, the so-called
"theory of super-addition" (Uberlagerungstheorie).74 According to this
concept, incorporation in one state determines the "personal law" of a
company, which retains its legal personality wherever it acts. The state
where the management is domiciled, however, selectively may impose
its imperative company law to protect the interests of the local constit-
uencies of the company. Then, creditors, shareholders or employees'
representatives could invoke the local law that is more favorable for
them.
Advocates of this theory argue that the model already works suc-
cessfully in the United States, a federal system.75 Critics, however,
doubt whether the model can be transplanted to Europe where state
company laws are more diverse than in the U.S. As a result of struc-
tural and functional differences, state laws would often not create and
utilize parallel institutions. Arguably, the model could work where dif-
ations with the next three Member States---the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and
Denmark-as mandated in the Acts of Accession, were terminated without a result; Tim-
mermanns, Die europdische Rechtsangleichung im Gesellschaftsrecht, 48 RABELSZ 1, 39-40
(1984). Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 414, report preparatory works on an agreement on
the transfer of the seat of a company, but do not indicate a chance for a realization in the near
future.
74. This theory, based on American models, has been introduced by Sandrock to the Euro-
pean discussion. See Sandrock, Ein amerikanisches Lehrstu'ck fur das Kollisionsrecht der
Kapitalgesellschaften, 42 RABELsZ 227 (1978).
75. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of article IV of the Constitution, the states have
to recognize the legal personality of a company incorporated in a sister state; but they are still
entitled to impose regulations on companies acting in their territories.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 296-97 (1971). A corporation,
formed in compliance with the law of one State is governed by this law as to its legal personality
and corporate structure even if its decisions are made and its business is performed in another
state. Sections 311-12 contain limitations on this concept, arising from a state's power to regulate
business activities in its own territory.
On the development of the common law view that the internal affairs of a company were to be
governed by the law of the state of incorporation, see Buxbaum, supra note 13. It has been
proposed that a state should be permitted to protect itself against "pseudo-foreign companies" by
applying local law to the internal affairs of foreign corporations. See Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Cor-
porations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955). The theory had significant influence only in two states, New
York and California. See, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1301-1320 (1962); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 2100-2116 (1977); as to case law, see, e.g., Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App.
2d 399, 412, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727-28 (1961). According to a recent analysis, the traditional
concept still prevails in the U.S.; the law of the state of incorporation almost always governs the
internal affairs. See Kozyris, supra note 9.
For a detailed description of both the role of choice-of-law rules in U.S. company law and the
impact of provisions of the U.S. Constitution, see R. BUXBAUM & K. Horr, LEGAL HARMONI-
ZATION AND THE BUSINESS ErrERPRIuSE 62 (Integration through Law: Europe and the Ameri-
can Federal Experience No. 2.4, M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe & J. Weiler eds. 1988).
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ferences between foreign law imported by the migrating company and
domestic law imposed upon the company are less significant. 76 While
in the U.S. "splitting" the law applicable to a company may provide a
sufficient remedy to protect local interests, in Europe the differences
between national laws appear to create insurmountable problems for a
meaningful application of this theory.
77
The second approach is based on the headquarters theory, but at-
tempts to avoid the rigid consequence of death for a company moving
its seat to another state. This approach utilizes a principle of substan-
tive company law, an "identity-preserving change of the legal form."'17
National laws permit such a change of legal form in a domestic con-
text, for example, between a stock company and a limited liability
company. Generally, these laws require a qualified majority of share-
holders to approve the necessary amendment of the charter and a
change of the company's form. With the registration of the decision
the corporation continues to exist in a new form but as the same legal
person;79 neither a winding-up procedure nor an incorporation of a
new, different company is necessary. The concept requires an incorpo-
ration in the new host state but guarantees the company's continued
legal existence.
The same idea could be transposed to the transnational Commu-
nity level and applied to a foreign company that moves its manage-
ment into another Member State. In fact, this has already occurred on
76. Information rights of shareholders or the availability of a derivative action might be an
example. See BUXEAUM & HoPT, supra note 75, at 92-103, who discuss possible conflicts of
interests. These rights would fall into a minimum burden group. They also refer to fiduciary
duties of the management or cumulative voting rights where the conflict between the interests of
the incorporating and the receiving state may become more serious.
77. It is significant that authors who favor this theory do not provide a satisfactory answer to
the crucial problems. Behrens, supra note 6, at 514, acknowledges that conflict-of-law rules can-
not resolve the differences. Sandrock, Die multinationalen Korporationen in internationalen
Priwtrecht, in INTERNATIONALIE PROBLEME MULTINATIONALER KORPORATIONEN 208 (1978),
admits the existence of serious problems but shows no feasible way for a solution. On the issue of
worker co-determination, he proposes that a foreign corporation does not have to adopt its legal
structure but that every decision of the board that could have come out differently if employees
had been represented in accordance with German law should be void. For a justified criticism see
Ebenroth & Sura, supra note 12, at 335-36.
In addition, it has been argued that the extent to which the company's constituents may
legitimately be protected remains too uncertain. See Ebenroth & Sura, id at 334.
78. In the German literature the model was proposed, ag., by Behrens, supra note 15, at 591;
see also Grossfeld & Jasper, Identitdtswahrende Fusion von Kapitalgeselischaften in die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 53 RABELSZ 52-62 (1989).
79. Aktiengesetz, arts. 362-93 (W. Ger.) [German Stock Corporation Act]; Codice Civile,
art. 2498 (Italy).
One of the major advantages over a complete liquidation derives from the fact that one can
avoid a taxation of the corporation's entire assets; rights and obligations would automatically be
transferred, as well as the ownership in assets.
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an international level.so An argument could be made that Member
States have a duty to apply this model. First, as the Court has repeat-
edly stated, in the absence of Community measures non-discrimina-
tion is still a fundamental principle for state legislation.8' Thus, one
could argue that if a country offers this opportunity to domestic com-
panies, it must also offer the same rights to companies from other
Member States.
An argument that goes beyond the non-discrimination aspect of
the problem is based on the concept of "least restrictive measures."
Where states are permitted to maintain national legislation in order to
protect public interests, their measures must not be disproportionate. 82
Consequently, they must take into account the regulatory procedures
80. See Judgment of Nov. 12, 1965, Cass., BeIg., 20 REVUE CRIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE
BELGE 392 (1966), cited by Grossfeld & Jasper, supra note 78, at 58, where the court held that an
originally British company became a Belgian company after transferring its seat and restructur-
ing in accordance with Belgian law. Behrens, supra note 15, at 591, reports a case where a com-
pany wanted to move from Luxemburg to Germany. Timmermans, supra note 6, at 358, refers to
this possibility under Belgian and Italian law.
Ebenroth & Eyles, supra note 15, at 366, give an overview on the current situation in the
Member States. In most countries, no definite answer exists whether national laws at present
permit such a transaction. It appears that Germany and Greece have the most rigid rules: a new
company must be formed in the receiving state. Other countries, such as Italy, Portugal, and
probably France, permit the adaptation of the company to domestic law and in that case recog-
nize the identity of the company.
81. See Van Binsbergen v. Berdrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299,
regarding services, and Reyners v. Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 631 regarding the establishment of
natural persons. Such statements exist also in the cases discussed above. See the Commission's
position in Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 293-94, and the corresponding opinion of
the Court at para. 24, both rejecting the French contention that in the absence of uniform tax
laws Member States could apply their national laws without restriction.
82. On the "least-restrictive" principle, see, eg., for the free movement of goods, Commission
v. Denmark, 56 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 619 (1989). There the Court accepted the argument that no
Community standard existed for the recycling of beverage containers. It also acknowledged that
the protection of the environment could justify national measures with a negative impact on
Community trade. Nevertheless, it held that the Danish "recycling law" was in some aspects too
restrictive and disproportionate to its goal.
This principle was extended to the freedom to provide services in Webb, 1981 E.C.R. 3305,
3319-20, 3325-26. Recently, the Court affirmed that Member States must not unduly restrict
insurance companies established in another Member State from providing their services. See
Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3755. In the Court's view, Member States were prohibited
from duplicating the requirements which had already been fulfilled in another state.
Although articles 59 and 60, referring to services, and article 52 contain similar language, it is
uncertain whether the Court has ever extended the "least restrictive" principle to the freedom of
establishment. In Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2971, the Court found a violation of Community law
although the challenged provision applied equally to foreign and domestic lawyers. Everling,
Vertragsverhandlungen und Vertragspraxis 1957, dargestellt an den Kapitein Niederlassungsrecht
und Dienstleistungsfreiheit des EWG Vertrages, in EINE ORDNUNGSPOLITIK FOR EUROPA -
FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS VON DER GROEBEN 111, 116-17 (E. Mestmacker, H. Mailer & H.
Schasse eds. 1987), admits that the Court went very far in this direction but still sees only an
extended application of the non-discrimination principle. But see Steindorff, Reichweite der
Niederlassungfreiheit, 23 EUROPARECHT 19, 22-23 (1988), who thinks that the Court went be-
yond the non-discrimination principle; see also Behrens, supra note 6, 510-11, who shares
Steindorff's interpretation of the Court's practice; see also supra, note 42, for the interpretation
that Daily Mail seems to adopt the latter position.
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of the state where the transferring company was initially incorporated,
which are designed to assure the preservation of corresponding public
interests.8 3 This principle, already acknowledged in the area of the
right to provide services, would, if applied to company laws, oblige
Member States to recognize procedures and acts in another Member
State which were taken in the course of the formation or auditing of
companies. 4 To require an immigrating company to liquidate and
form a new legal person would duplicate procedures and constitute an
arbitrary and disproportionate measure that would violate the Treaty.
It has been stated that the receiving state can apply this concept
only if the law of the originating state also would permit such a trans-
action.85 One can argue, however, that the prohibition of dispropor-
tionate measures applies equally to the originating state. Only
restrictions which are necessary to protect a public interest may be
maintained.8 6 Otherwise there could be no justification for a national
law to prevent such a transfer; national laws would have to permit
such a transfer from their territory.
8 7
Since this approach is still based on the headquarters theory, it
requires the incorporation of the company in the receiving state. This
is certainly not an easy procedure since complex restructuring is neces-
sary; it is time-consuming and more restrictive than the present Amer-
ican doctrine. It makes the transfer easier, however, and presents a
feasible option for Community countries that desire more flexibility
than is provided by the original headquarters theory.88
V. SUMMARY
This article has discussed the free establishment problem that
arises when a company within the EC attempts to transfer its head-
quarters to another Member State without changing its incorpora-
83. Webb, 1981 E.C.R. at 3325-26.
84. Behrens, supra note 15, at 593, states that the controlling procedure in the course of
formation of a company should not be duplicated.
85. See Behrens, supra note 15, at 591; Grossfeld & Jasper, supra note 78, at 53.
86. Daily Mail shows a possible application of the concept of least restrictive measures - tax
duties that have arisen in the past. In that case, the threat of liquidation is probably the only
means to secure the payment. Beitzge, supra note 1, at 41-43, mentions the protection of share-
holders and, in particular, creditors.
87. One might regret that the Court used such broad language, which seems to permit the
application of the headquarters theory without any qualification. Still, one could argue that a
national court should refer an adequate case in order to provide an opportunity to the Court to
consider a different solution. See Sandrock, supra note 15, at 512 n.59.
88. But see Timmermanns, supra note 6, who argues that even this modified form would still
violate the Treaty.
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tion.5 9 The Treaty gives no definite answer to the question whether the
receiving state may refuse to recognize the legal personality of a mov-
ing company. It provides for the free establishment of companies but
also calls for negotiations among Member States on the recognition of
companies which transfer their seat.
Three recent decisions by the Court on this issue leave uncertainty
as to whether the Member States may still apply the restrictive head-
quarters theory which requires that a company be incorporated in the
state where its real seat is located. It is possible to confine the third
case, Daily Mail, to its fiscal aspects and to argue that the conflict-of-
law question is yet unanswered. It is argued, however, that the Court
indeed accepted the fact that a majority of the Member States cur-
rently apply the headquarters theory. Due to significant differences be-
tween national company laws, this theory appears permissible in order
to protect national interests, despite its restrictive effect on the free
allocation of resources. Member States cannot be required to apply the
incorporation theory necessary for a complete realization of the free-
dom of establishment of companies prior to the creation of Commu-
nity-wide solutions in the politically sensitive areas of taxation,
company structure and employee co-determination. 9°
It is difficult to predict the impact of the Daily Mail decision on the
development of company law in Europe. By deferring to national con-
flict-of-law rules, the Court has indirectly put some pressure on both
the Community and Member States to harmonize national company
89. I found no statistics regarding how often such a problem does in fact arise. P. Cecchini
mentions the access to new geographical markets as a main goal for 1992, but provides no empir-
ical data. P. CECCHINI, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992-THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MAR-
KET 86 (1988). The limited number of cases reported in the doctrinal debate seems to indicate
that at least in the past the problem had no great practical importance. Arguably, the present
legal situation has a deterring effect. Grossfeld, supra note 12, at 331. Major parts of the debate
and the case law are limited to Germany, probably because it provides on the one hand an
economic environment attractive for foreign companies, but on the other hand comprehensive
rules on employee co-determination.
There is, however, agreement that transborder activities are an important factor in the course
of the creation of the single market. See, eg., the position of the Commission in BULL. EC, Supp.
3/88, at 8-9 (1988); P. CECCHINI, supra, at 53-54. One can thus assume that such transfers will
occur more frequently in the future.
90. See also Meier-Schatz, Europdische Harmonisierung des Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarkt-
rechts, 41 RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFr 84, 106, 109 (1989): areas which include political values,
such as employee co-determination, require a centralized, Community wide solution before the
incorporation theory can be applied in all Member States.
Chances for rapid progress in sensitive areas on a Community level are, it seems, rather
small. There, any harmonization at the Community level might not take place without compre-
hensive democratic representation. As long as Community decisions lack the necessary legiti-
macy, without representation of all interest groups, a uniform answer to this politically sensitive
problem can hardly be found. See Memorandum on a statute for a European company, PE DOC
A 2-405/88, February 24, 1989, where such a representation on Community level is seen as a
major requirement.
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laws. Currently, it is unlikely that Community measures will soon cre-
ate a fairly uniform body of company laws; the Daily case, however,
might revitalize the process of company law harmonization.
At present, only modified national conflict-of-law rules will im-
prove the situation. Here, the technique of "splitting" the law which
governs the company is of limited applicability in Europe due to the
significant differences between national company laws.
Member States should, however, adopt another possible approach
which acknowledges their right to apply the headquarters theory, but
at the same time takes into account the prohibition on applying dis-
proportionate measures. 91 This solution requires that Member States
permit a company to retain its legal identity although it must adjust its
structure to the law of the receiving state. It satisfies the interests of
the Member States and, at the same time, takes into account the need
to develop a less restrictive legal environment for companies in the
European Market.
91. For the discussion whether articles 52 and 58 include such a prohibition, see supra note
1293
